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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CHALLENGES TO APPELLEES' "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" 
Some confusion may be entering in as a result of the "Statement of the Case" provided by 
the Attorneys for the Appellees, Heideman and Elswick, in that they have failed to note that 
matters involving Sykes and the so-called "Sykes Family Trust" were bifurcated from the 
Christiansen matter at a point before the case in chief was heard in October of 1999. This would 
explain why the Appellees "Addendum 1" makes no mention of the Christiansen judgment and 
why "Addendum 9" contains serious internal contradictions, i.e., being filed of record before the 
alleged date of the trial. Originally date stamped as August 31, 1999, later hand stamped on "9-
7-99," the "Judgment and Order" refers to a "trial before a jury on the 20th and 21st of October 
1999," a good month and half after the Judgment and Order was entered! Perhaps such a 
"cart before the horse" situation is appropriate as it reflects quite well what actually happened in 
the Christiansen case. Judge Eyre entered his "Order for Dismissal of Claims Against William 
Christiansen" within 8 days of when Attorney Primavera made such a motion, and prior to 
Christiansen ever having been served! (Please see our arguments on pages 29-32, especially 
as it regards the granting of sanctions under Rule 11 found on p. 32, in our original "Brief of 
Appellant." Also note that Judge Eyre granted attorneys fees and sanctions to the moving party 
even though an offer was made to voluntarily remove any reference to him in the pleadings. 
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The Court's order allowed for the award of attorneys fees and sanctions but reserved the 
amount of the award "until judgment is rendered on Mr. Christiansen's counter-claim." (See 
Addendum 8 included in Appellees Brief filed by Heideman and Elswick at paragraph 5). 
The Christiansen matter was subsequently bifurcated and the subject counter-claim was 
heard before a jury in July of 1999 [See "Minutes Jury Trial" (R2191)]. The jury was never 
allowed to consider whether attorneys fees or sanctions should be awarded, only the amount of 
sustainable damages, since Judge Eyre had already ruled that fees and sanctions were in order. 
After hearing the arguments put forth, the jury granted $1,000, as compensatory damages to 
William Christiansen. (See Addendum 9 included in Appellees Brief filed by Heideman and 
Elswick). 
Whether the actions of Judge Eyre so early on in the case, 3 years before it finally came 
to trial might suggest a general prejudice against Hatch in that particular venue, we would leave 
to the judgment of this Court. However, it might be noted that Judge Mower, who presided over 
the Hatch v. Sykes case which led up to the original damage award, had been brought in from the 
Sixth Judicial District, Sevier County, because none of the local judges at that time could be 
found without a prejudice against Hatch. The record will also show that 3 different judges had 
either resigned from the case or recused themselves before Judge Eyre took matters on. 
Moving on to Appellees' restatement of the issues to be reviewed as sought by Hatch, 
"No. 1," (Page 3 of Appellees' Brief), the attorney for the Appellees quotes only the first part of 
what is contained in our Appellant's Brief, "Summary of Argument" on Ps. 39-40 of same. What 
was so damaging to Hatch's case was not just that Sykes was allowed to so frequently introduce 
"irrelevant and immaterial testimony," but of such a nature as to defame Hatch in a blatant effort 
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to prejudice the jury against him. As if that was not enough, Sykes was then allowed, in so many 
instances, to vaunt his own virtues by contrast. 
Regarding Appellees' restatement of our issues framed on appeal as No. 3, they say we 
objected to "the trial court granting of Defendant William Christiansen's Motion to Dismiss 
before he was served." While it was improper for the lower court to grant such a motion without 
first having obtained jurisdiction over the party, our primary objection was that the court granted 
it so precipitously that we had no opportunity to show why he had been named in the first place. 
Our position was that as an in rem action it was necessary for the court to obtain 
jurisdiction over the real property ostensibly owned by Christiansen but which had in fact 
become property belonging to Sykes, which fact Sykes was concealing from creditors by leaving 
the record title in Christiansen's name. As an "after-acquired" title to the said property, Hatch 
was not challenging the original trustee sale from Zions to Christiansen, (the only issue found to 
be res judicata based on prior court rulings) but wanting to show that the subject property was 
now owned by Sykes and should be subject to attachment for the purpose of collecting on the 
debt owed Hatch. This is why Mr. Amott, the attorney representing Hatch at the time, was so 
willing to dismiss Christiansen as a party, so long as the court would allow Hatch in his 
"collection case" to look at the property in a different light, now that he had evidence that a 
transfer of ownership had (surreptitiously been made from Christiansen to Sykes. [Please see 
Exhibit "C," 2nd page ol "Greenbelt Application," where property is being legally described. At 
the 4th from bottom property description, the owner's name is shown as "Christiansen, William 
(Dennis Sykes, contract buyer)." This is attached to Addendum 4 of the Appellees Brief on 
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Appeal, op eit, which is a copy of Hatch's original Complaint in the subject matter now being 
appealed. The same exhibit can be found in the lower court record as R-0008] 
Had the attorney for Hatch been given his opportunity to explain this to the court, rather 
than being ruled against prematurely, the outcome could have certainly been quite different. 
CHALLENGES TO APPELLEEST "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
To provide greater clarity on the matters before this court it is necessary to restate some 
of the "facts" presented by the Appellees: While it is true that Hatch had entered into an option 
agreement with Sykes in 1974, it was not for the purchase of a "home and property," rather for 
land only, a portion of a larger piece Hatch owned. While this difference may be immaterial, 
what needs to be noted is that the legal dispute which arose had nothing to do with the original 
transaction. Rather it came about because Sykes claimed that Hatch had given him a separate 
option to the remaining part of the property Hatch intended to keep for himself by producing a 
"notice of interest," purporting to have Hatch's initials on it and which Sykes was treating as an 
"option to purchase." It was this claim by Sykes to having a valid option on Hatch's remaining 
portion of the land, which document Hatch said was a pure fabrication and forgery, that 
generated the "long and tortuous" litigation referred to by Appellees and ending up with Hatch 
getting the substantial money judgment against Sykes. 
In "No. 9" of the "facts" (p. 4), Appellees are referring to Judge Mower's order of April 
17, 1991, which gives as a basis for attorneys fees being granted against Hatch his failure to 
notify the parties of a filing and dismissal of "their bankruptcy." The bankruptcy referred to had 
no direct bearing on Hatch, the primary Plaintiff, but was a Chapter 11 petition for reorganization 
that had been filed under the Federal Bankruptcy Code by University Avenue Development 
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Associates, a limit partnership which had a peripheral interest in the land subject of the lawsuit 
between Sykes and Hatch. 
The partnership, UADA, claimed an interest in the 3 plus acres which was then under 
threat of foreclosure by Zions Bank, the same piece of property Sykes was claiming to have an 
option on. UADA had, in an attempt to preserve the asset about to be lost as a result of Sykes' 
slandering of the title, noted that interest in its bankruptcy filing, hoping in this way to invoke the 
automatic stay and prevent the trustee sale from going forward. Sykes had already informed 
Zions Bank of his interest in purchasing the property with cash should the bank notice it up for 
sale. His bogus claims against the subject property, while not properly founded, had made the 
land unmarketable and prevented Hatch from borrowing money needed to pay off Zions when it 
called the loan. The effort failed almost immediately, resulting in a request by UADA for the 
petition to be withdrawn. But it was Sykes dogged determination and resistance to having the 
bankruptcy proceeding dismissed that kept it going for some considerable length of time and thus 
requiring that a notice to the parties might have been necessary. 
Hatch's attempts to sell the "Christiansen" property at Sheriffs Sale, as referred to in No. 
10 of the "facts" on p. 4 of Appellees Brief, was based on his belief that the property did at that 
point in time now belong to Sykes, a point Judge Mower was not willing to recognize. This 
belief was based on evidence then of record showing "after-acquired title" by Sykes, making it 
subject to execution by Hatch in his attempts to collect on the judgment obtained in the 
preceeding lawsuit. [See document entitled "Application for Assessment and Taxation of 
Agricultural Land," commonly referred to as a "Greenbelt Application." Note the legal 
description, 2nd page, fourth from the bottom showing Sykes as the owner of the land, not 
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Christiansen. This was the same land Hatch had lost at Zion's Trustee Sale noted above and 
which he was now attempting to subject to a Sheriffs Sale. (The document was attached to 
Hatch's original Complaint and paginated as R-0009)] 
Regarding No. 27 in Appellees statement of "facts," we have already commented on this 
misstatement, as can be seen within the wording itself. How can a "Judgment and Order" dated 
August 7, 1999 reflect the findings of a jury trial held later that October? But the attorneys for 
the Appellees have simply quoted an inconsistency which appeared in the order itself The jury 
trial which was to decide the extent of damages allegedly suffered by Christiansen was actually 
had on July 21, 1999 (R-2191,92). 
CHALLENGES TO APPELLEES' 
"SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT" AND "ARGUMENT" 
While our Appellant's Brief called attention specifically to only 2 of the unwarranted 
exhibits Sykes was allowed to present and have entered into the record, these were singled out 
because of how Sykes so obviously intended to use them to prejudice the jury against Hatch. At 
least 2 others were highly prejudicial to the interest of Hatch, Exhibits 116 and 117. About 
these, Sykes was allowed to examine Hatch in spite of vigorous objections by Mr. Amott, and 
then have them admitted in the record! 
As to whether the "trial court set clear parameters for Sykes" — we might agree that Judge 
Burningham may have attempted in some instances, but unfortunately, and inevitably, he 
allowed Sykes to continue to exceed such limits. (Please see Judge Burningham's own 
admission toward the end of the trial as quoted in Appellant Hatch's Brief on Appeal, page 26). 
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Furthermore, Judge Burningham sustained Mr. Amott's objection to Sykes asking Hatch 
to comment on the Orem City letter as not being "relevant to the claim they're making against 
you in this case...It's not relevant." [See Trial Transcript of October 25, 1999, 8:13-18 (R-2472)]. 
But yet the Judge later allowed Sykes to testify about it and have it entered in as a formal exhibit 
(See Trial Exhibit No. 113). 
The attorney who represented Hatch at the trial of the case in chief, Mr. Amott, 
admittedly did not object as often and strenuously as he should have but became discouraged 
when he saw that Judge Burningham was determined to allow such a wide range of immaterial 
and prejudicial material. [Please see the objections raised by Mr. Amott early on, which were 
not sustained by the court (R-2469, 6:15-18). Rather than sustaining the objection and 
admonishing Sykes to stay strictly on the matters he intended to show at trial, he simply advised 
the jury that he would instruct them as to the law and not to listen to what Sykes was saying on 
legal matters. But when did that ever stop juries from listening to what is being said, even when 
told to disregard it and ordering the testimony stricken? 
Within a paragraph or two, Sykes was going on telling the jury what the applicable law 
was in the case (ibid 7:20). On page 9 of the same transcript, the court allowed Sykes to claim he 
tried to settle with Hatch and that he would prove that Hatch had said r'I am going to pursue you 
to your dying days." (ibid 9:12) What relevance did that have to the case at hand? Sykes then 
goes on to make such self-serving statements as "I was an internationally recognized wilderness 
explorer." Sykes was allowed to go on for another 4 pages with the same kind of immaterial 
statements when finally Mr. Amott got up enough courage to challenge it and objected, saying 
"Do we have testimony here, or are we giving an opening statement?" (ibid 13:17-18) But 
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Sykes was not daunted. He went on in the same vein, accusing Hatch of violating the local 
zoning ordinance (ibid 13:21-22) and of performing other "fraudulent acts." (ibid 15:24-25) 
This prompted Mr. Amott to object saying, "he is not only testifying not under oath, he is 
testifying about irrelevant things..." (ibid 16:12-14) 
It soon became clear to Mr. Amott it was useless to object since Mr. Sykes was allowed 
to continue going on about irrelevant matters as though he were giving direct testimony, but 
without being sworn, about his financial net worth, his financial woes, and then to say "I have 
not received one single cent of benefit from the trust..." (ibid 23:6-7). 
Appellees say we have complained only about prejudicial statements made in the opening 
argument. Let us consider some from direct testimony: While Mr. Sykes was examining Hatch 
during the course of the trial, on October 26, 1999, he was allowed to question Hatch as to 
certain bankruptcies, in which he had some personal interest, over the objection of Mr. Amott as 
being irrelevant [and prejudicial] (R-2472, 13:22) but was allowed to continue to charge Hatch 
with financial improprieties for another 4 pages of transcript, effectively calling Hatch a liar, 
badgering him by repeating the same accusation several times, not content with Hatch's flat out 
denials. This prompted Mr. Amott to finally enter another objection, (ibid 17:23) The court, 
after allowing the opposing parties to spend another 3 pages arguing the matter, finally admitted 
the line of questions and submission of an exhibit, saying it was certainly "tangential" but 
relevant! "Tangential" is defined in Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd College Edition, "in 
the direction of a tangent, going off in a tangent, diverging or digressing" yet Judge Burningham 
allowed it as relevant! (ibid 20:24) 
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Sykes continued to badger Hatch in direct examination over Mr. Amott's objections (ibid 
27:9-11, 20&21) accusing Hatch of "an attempt to defraud everyone..." (ibid 28:6-7). Finally 
Judge Burningham did sustain the objection (ibid 28:16-17) but allowed Sykes to pursue the 
same line of questions for at least another 4 pages, with every question being asked in the vein of 
casting doubt on the veracity and honesty of Hatch, who was merely trying to collect on a 
previously obtained legal judgment. 
As to whether the material was prejudicial, or harmless and did not prejudice the jury, it 
is for this court to decide. We would argue that any reasonable person can see how seriously 
prejudicial such statements and documents would be to jury members. 
In the final paragraph of the Appellees "Summary of Argument," the attorneys say that 
even if the trial court erred procedurally in granting the Motion to Dismiss Christiansen, which 
they are forced to acknowledge by the facts, "all parties agreed to the dismissal." But this begs 
the question. Had Hatch, by and through his attorney, been allowed to resist the motion and 
explain the reasons Christiansen had been included on the title page of the case, but not served, 
the court would not have been able to justify imposing sanctions and attorney fees. Or had Judge 
Eyre simply read paragraph 12 of Hatch's Amended Complaint, he would have realized there 
might be a whole different basis for naming Christiansen as a party apart from the facts upon 
which Judge Mower had allowed him to be dismissed. 
Attorneys for the Appellees quote certain cases under Point No. 1 of their "Argument" 
which say the lower court's decision will not be overturned "unless it is 'beyond the limits of 
reasonability.'" It should be very clear that this is precisely what we are arguing, and that the 
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many abuses by Sykes in what he was proffering as evidence went way beyond "relevance, and 
probativeness" and more importantly substantially prejudicial and therefore very unreasonable. 
Appellees say that the Hatch has not established that the "error [by the court allowing 
irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial testimony by Sykes] affected the outcome of the case." We 
would beg the Courts forgiveness if we have failed to clearly establish this in our initial brief. If 
this court will review pages 35 through 39 of Appellant's Brief, it should see that we have made 
this case very well, i.e., had the court not allowed Sykes to influence and prejudice the jury 
members against Hatch to such a degree, and to "toot his own horn" as he did, the outcome 
should have been totally reversed. 
But as the Appellees have raised that issue, we would offer the following few items by 
way of reminder and rebuttal. We would hope that this statement of occurrences during Hatch's 
case in chief will show that certainly any reasonable jury member would have found in favor of 
Hatch had he not been so badly prejudiced in advance during the entire course of the trial: 
1. Johnny Iverson, a hostile witness for the Plaintiff Hatch, in fact brother-in-law to the 
Defendant Sykes and acting trustee for the alleged family trust, admitted that he had signed 2 full 
books of checks in blank in advance and given them to Sykes to finish filling out as he wished. 
This allowed Sykes, although the trustor to the so-called "Irrevocable Trust," and not one of the 
beneficidries, to spend the money as he wished without any outside control. (See full transcript 
of Johnny Iverson testimony at the trial proceedings on October 20, 1999, entered into the record 
on appeal as R-002747, p. 28, lines 3 through 18). 
2. Iverson also admitted that Sykes had been renting portions of the trust property and 
receiving rent money without accounting for it to anyone, (ibid p. 61:3-12) 
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3. He also admitted that he and his wife occupied the very valuable 7-acre estate 
"owned" by the trust, valued at several hundred thousands of dollars, for the rental payment of 
merely $501.00 per month. [See Transcript of Proceedings, October 19, 1999 (R-2470) at p. 
134:2-6] 
4. Eventhough Sykes claimed Johnny Iverson had been serving for several years as 
"trustee" for the alleged trusts, Iverson maintained that he had never received copies of the 
subject trust agreements even though he had made "repeated demands of Dwane Sykes and 
Patricia Sykes for a copy." [See full transcript of Iverson Testimony in "Jury Trial," 10-20-99, 
(R-002747) p. 24, lines 14-16] Nor had he ever received a list of the assets allegedly put into the 
trust. (Ibid 24:19-25 and 27:9-18) 
5. Testimony at trial showed that Sykes had been able to retire a personal line of credit, 
money he had borrowed from Far West Bank, in the amount of some $135,000 through the sale 
of a "trust" asset, the so-called "Lynnwood property," AKA "Palisades property" acknowledged 
by Sykes as belonging to the "irrevocable trust." [Partial Transcript of Proceedings, 10-20-99 
(R-2471) 33:8 and 39:1-16] 
In both their "Summary of Argument" and Point 2 of their "Argument", Appellees 
maintain that Jury Instruction No. 19 was appropriate. The question is raised by the Appellees, 
"was this not a case in equity?" Judge Burningham seemed to justify allowing Jury Instruction 
No. 19 on that basis. And if Instruction 19 had been there independent of all the prejudicial 
testimony Sykes had been allowed to present, or infer by the questions he was allowed asked 
during the trial, it might have in truth been harmless and not necessarily prejudicial; but coming 
at the end and capping all that had gone on before, false accusations by Sykes against Hatch on 
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numerous occasions, attempting to disparage his character and show a pattern of deception, now 
to have a specific instruction that the jury must find that Hatch had clean hands to justify the 
collection of a legal debt, could not but influence them to a very significant and negative extent. 
But how can it be said that a simple "collection action" based on a legal judgment is an 
action in "equity." All Hatch was asking the court to do was allow him a chance to collect on the 
debt already legally established, not based on the theory of "unjust enrichment" or fairness this or 
fairness that, but a soundly tested judgment and money award of dollars and cents! 
Regarding Appellees contentions under Point 3 of their "Argument," that it was right for 
Christiansen to answer the Amended Complaint without even being served we would make the 
following observation and points of law: 1. The original complaint filed by Hatch himself did 
not list Christiansen as a co-defendant nor reference him in the "Jurisdictional" portion of the 
Complaint. The Complaint was filed of record on the 30th of November 1995. Rule 4(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that to be valid "the summons together with a copy of the 
complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint." After putting 
in an appearance in the case on the 26th of April 1996, Mr. Amott subsequently requested the 
right to amend the complaint. The Amended Complaint, which was not filed until the 27th of 
August 1996 (R-188), named William Christiansen as a codefendant in the case but no attempt 
was made to serve him or gain jufisdiction over his person. This was in excess of 270 days after 
the filing of the original complaint. The only way Mr. Amott could have brought Mr. 
Christiansen under the jurisdiction of the court, since he had not been named in the original 
complaint and given these circumstances, would have been to file for and obtain from the court 
the right to add him as a new and "indispensable" party to the action. (See Rule 19, Utah Rules 
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of Civil Procedure) This Mr. Amott never intended to do. Clearly Mr. Christiansen was never 
under the jurisdiction of the court even by volunteering to answer a complaint he was never 
served. 
The Appellees have suggested that Mr. Christiansen's appearance is analogous to the case 
where a named party puts in a "special appearance." But in such a case, the party is appearing 
precisely to argue against being named in the action. What could have made Mr. Primavera, 
attorney for William Christiansen, so eager to enter the fray though not yet invited? Surely not 
what he might have perceived as a chance to "make a quick buck." Mr. Primavera had been 
serving as an attorney for Sykes in the matters between Hatch, Sykes and Christiansen for some 
time so he was immediately aware that the action had been brought against Sykes. So later, 
when he picked up on the naming of Christiansen on the face of the Amended Complaint, he was 
ready for action. 
Attorney for Hatch, Mr. Amott, was perfectly willing to drop Christiansen's name off the 
case, never having intended for the court to gain jurisdiction over him in personam. The only 
reason he had even mentioned Christiansen in the Amended Complaint was so the court would 
have jurisdiction over land that the public records showed in his name but was in fact used and 
equitably owned by Sykes. It was Mr. Amott's hope that Hatch would be able to execute against 
it for the debt owed by Sykes. [Exhibit "C," 2nd page of "Greenbelt Application," gives a legal 
description of the subject property in the 4th from bottom paragraph, the owner's name is shown 
as "Christiansen, William (Dennis Sykes, contract buyer)." (R-0008)] 
But Judge Eyre's granting of the Christiansen Motion, without ever having jurisdiction 
over him, was procedurally wrong and subjected Hatch not only to attorneys fees but to the 
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counter claims enunciated against him. It is Hatch who should be compensated in this instance, 
not only in having the earlier judgment reversed but in allowing him to go back after 
Christiansen and Primavera for his own attorneys fees. If the court will take cognizance of the 
amount of voluminous filings that took place between Primavera and Amott, following Judge 
Eyre's granting of the dismissal in early December 1996 until March 1997, it will see that a 
substantial portion of the entire Files, No. 1, 2, and part of 3, was devoted contests between 
Amott and Primavera. Judge Eyre also included the granting of an award of $1,500 in attorneys' 
fees for Primavera's gratuitous filings. This award of fees was recorded on the 7th of February 
1997 (R-0434). This part of the action has also subjected Hatch to paying his own attorney's 
considerable fees during a long and drawn out process, covering some 4 months, during which 
time Primavera was pressing the court to grant a "malicious prosecution" judgment award against 
Hatch and his attorney. Eventually sanctions were finally confirmed, which subjected Hatch to 
Christiansen's damage claims, resulting in an award of $1,000, that which is being challenged in 
this appeal besides having to pay for his own defense during the interim and on the occasion of 
the one-day jury trial in July of 1999. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Judge Eyre failed to follow the law during the early part of the bifurcated case by failing 
or refusing to give Hatch's attobiey the opportunity to be heard and in assuming jurisdiction over 
matters between Hatch and Christensen which had not been established under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This resulted in Judge Eyre granting attorney fees and sanctions against Hatch 
contrary to law. We respectfully request this court to reverse that part of the judgment which 
granted attorneys fees in the amount of $1,500 and sanctions against Hatch in the amount of 
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$1,000.00 and to remand the matter to the lower court with instructions to it that an appropriate 
award be given Hatch for attorneys fees, and/or sanctions against Mr. Primavera and his client 
Christiansen. 
Judge Burningham abused his discretion when he continued to allow scandalous, 
irrelevant accusations made by Sykes against Hatch to become part of the record. These 
continuous efforts made by Sykes took place throughout the trial. So that when Sykes later 
proposed Jury Instruction # 19 it was with the intent of making it appear Hatch had come with 
unclean hands thus barring him the right to relief. Judge Burningham should never have 
approved such a potentially prejudicial instruction to be included, especially in view of all that 
had gone on uncontrolled during the several days of trial. 
When the Judge approved jury instruction # 19 in this case he went beyond what the law 
allows. There was nothing in this case that would allow the use of the unclean hands doctrine. 
The plaintiff had clean hands and this case was not in one in Equity but was one in Law only. 
"When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, the standard of review 
is not phrased as 'clearly erroneous.' Rather, appellate review of a trial court's determination of 
the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness.' Controlling Utah case law teaches that 
'correctness' means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any 
degree to the tnaljjudge's determination of law." See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994). 
With respect to the case in chief, regarding Hatch's attempt to collect on his money 
judgment, Hatch requests the Court of Appeals to set aside the findings of the lower court and 
remand the case to the district court for a new and fair trial. 
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Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February, 2005. 
M 
jencer F. Hatch 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Howard F. Hatch 
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